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FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY: THE 
JUVENILE COURT AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 
Samuel M. Davis* 
THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT 
EXPERIMENT. By Ellen Ryerson. New York: Hill and Wang. 1978. 
Pp. 180. $9.95. 
There have been three great moments in the development of 
the juvenile court as an institution. The first was the creation of 
the country's first juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899. 
The second was the Supreme Court's momentous 1967 decision 
in In re Gault, 1 which precipitated a vast outpouring of decisions 
by lower, mostly state, courts, expanding the meaning and appli-
cation of Gault far beyond its specific holding. In Gault the Court 
held that young people are entitled to many of the same rights 
in juvenile court proceedings that adults enjoy in the criminal 
court, including the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel. Viewing 
Gault as a kind of shooting star, lower courts followed its spirit 
more than its letter, bringing about a significant transformation 
of the juvenile court in accordance with constitutional due pro-
cess requirements. 
The third watershed of the juvenile court's development is 
taking place now, barely eleven years after Gault. Ironically, it is 
the result of dissatisfaction with what the juvenile court has be-
come. The current movement is challenging some of the funda-
mental notions on which the juvenile court has been based, e.g., 
that the court ought to exercise very broad jurisdiction over all 
kinds of youthful misconduct, including truancy, disobedience to 
parents, and running away from home, and that the judge ought 
to possess very broad discretionto fashion an appropriate disposi-
tion to meet the needs of the individual child. The rather pro-
found changes urged in the proposed Juvenile Justice Standards, 
most of which have now been approved by the American Bar 
Association, are an example of this new movement in the juvenile 
court's development. The Standards propose, inter alia, to elimi-
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nate so-called "status offenses" from the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court, and to abandon the rehabilitative ideal in favor of the 
principle of proportionality-definite "punishments" to fit the 
wrong committed. 
Ellen Ryerson's new book spans all of these developments in 
her attempt to fathom the juvenile court's origins and to explain 
the loss of faith in its effectiveness as an institution. Her focus is 
on intellectual history, not social history, in that she is concerned 
with ideas more than with people. The subject lends itself partic-
ularly well to a humanistic approach, and professionals in the 
fields of history, law, psychiatry, and sociology will find The Best-
Laid Plans a significant and valuable addition to the literature 
on the juvenile court. 
In the introduction, Ryerson modestly acknowledges that 
"[o]ne asks for trouble by suggesting that an institution bears 
the imprint of a certain period .... " Yet she accomplishes this 
task with consummate skill. In its historical and sociological con-
text the .juvenile court as an institution was just as surely ah 
outgrowth of the progressive movement as in its legal context it 
was a product of the social jurisprudence movement. Ryerson 
does not simply begin, however, with the creation of the juvenile 
court by turn-of-the-century reformers; rather, she reaches back 
into the early nineteenth century to discover antecedents of the 
concept of specialized treatment for children. Moreover, she ana-
lyzes the changes since the progressive era in psychiatry, sociol-
ogy, and law that, along with the contrast between rhetoric and 
reality, have contributed to the failure of the juvenile court. 
She undoubtedly was aided in her task by the publication of 
earlier works that examined the same subject: Anthony Platt's 
The Child Savers (1969); Sanford Fox's 1970 Stanford Law 
Review article, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical 
Perspective; and Robert Mennel's Origins of the Juvenile Court: 
Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile 
Delinquents (published in a 1972 issue of Crime and 
Delinquency). Platt's and Fox's works in particular are 
"revisionist" accounts of the motivations that led to the creation 
of the juvenile court. They argue that the founders of the juvenile 
court were less concerned with the plight of children than with 
preserving traditional values against the rising tides of urbanism 
and industrialism that threatened to destroy those values. 
Ryerson augments her credibility by resisting jumping on the 
revisionist bandwagon. To be sure, she acknowledges the enor-
mous scope of urbanism, industrialism, and population growth 
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and their impact on American life and thought, and she recog-
nizes the threat these powerful forces posed to the romantic view 
of American life as rural, morally correct, and simple. But she is 
reluctant to consider this as direct evidence that the motives of 
reformers were other than humane. 
No one can fault the reformers for a lack of zeal or faith that 
their new creation would work. But their faith may have been 
misplaced because of the profound departure from existing prac-
tice that the juvenile court represented. It was envisioned more 
as a social agency than a court, leading Ryerson to comment: 
"Juvenile courts, unfettered by the rules of criminal procedure, 
took delinquency out of the adversary process much as other pro-
gressive reforms took issues out of the contentious, unpredictable 
world of electoral politics." 
Yet it was this conceptual difference that probably ac-
counted for much of the critical perception of the juvenile court 
as a social institution attempting to deal with the serious problem 
of crime. The criticism, in brief, was that as a social institution 
deployed to combat crime, the juvenile court was in over its head 
and poorly equipped to deal with the problem. In 1926, for exam-
ple, John H. Wigmore, the great evidence scholar, wrote: 
We recognize the beneficent function of the juvenile court. We 
have always supported it, and we are proud that Illinois invented 
it. But its devoted advocates, in their zeal, have lost their balance. 
And, as usual in other fields of science that have been awakening 
to their interest in the crime problem, their error is due to their 
narrow and imperfect conception of the criminal law. They are new 
to it, hence their inability to understand it. The criminal law does 
three things, two of which it does alone. (1) It pronounces and 
reaffirms the moral law. (2) It threatens other possible offenders, 
so as to deter them from offenses. (3) It handles this individual 
offender, now caught, so as to prevent repetition by him. 
Now the third of these things is the affair of the penal adminis-
trative branch of the state. . . . Ever since Raymond Saleilles, the 
Paris professor of law, thirty years ago published his book on "The 
Individualization of Punishment," that principle has found wider 
and wider recognition. But in many quarters it has come to be 
regarded as the only principle of criminal law; and that is where 
the social workers and the psychiatrists are going wrong. They are 
ignoring the other two functions of the criminal law, and they are 
virtually on the way to abolish criminal law and undermine social 
morality, by ignoring those other two functions .... The court-
room is the only place in the community today where the moral 
law is laid down to the people with the voice of authority. The 
churches do not do it. The clubs do not do it. Public opinion has 
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no concrete and authoritative organ. The court alone does it, 
through the criminal code. 
But the social woi;kers and the psychologists and the psychia-
trists know nothing of crime or wrong. They refer to "reactions" 
and "maladjustments" and "complexes." Look at that definition 
of crime, _quoted from a society for hygiene, on p. 311 of volume 
XVI of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology; crime, we 
learn, is "merely a pattern-shift, and one always highly potential, 
in the kaleidoscope of broad individuo-social handicap, hardship, 
and maladjustment .... " 
The people need to have the moral law dinned into their con-
sciences every day in the year. The juvenile court does not do that. 
And to segregate a large share of daily crime into the juvenile court 
is to take a long step toward undermining the whole criminal law.2 
To a limited extent, as a result of the Gault decision, tlie 
adversary process has returned to the juvenile court. Lawyers, 
who had been supplanted by social workers, psychologists, and 
psychiatrists, in turn have replaced the social scientists. But 
these reforms were instituted not as a protection for society, not 
as an answer to Wigmore's concerns, but rather as a protection 
for juveniles whose rights had too often been arbitrarily trampled. 
Thus Ryerson observes: "However intent reformers were upon the 
social or therapeutic nature of the juvenile court, and however 
successful in expunging from its language the vocabulary of crim-
inal law, the juvenile court was and is a legal institution." 
Even when viewed as a legal institution the juvenile court 
has met with harsh criticism for becoming too much like its crimi-
nal counterpart. Dissenting in the Gault case, Justice Stewart 
said: 
The inflexible restrictions that the Constitution so wisely 
made applicable to adversary criminal trials have no inevitable 
place in the proceedings of those public social agencies known as 
juvenile or family courts. And to impose the Court's long catalog 
of requirements upon juvenile proceedings in every area of the 
country is to invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth 
century. In that era there were no juvenile proceedings, and a child 
was tried in a conventional criminal court with all the trappings 
of a conventional criminal trial. So it was that a 12-year-old boy 
named James Guild was tried in New Jersey for killing Catharine 
Beakes. A jury found him guilty of murder, and he was sentenced 
to death by hanging. The sentence was executed. It was all very 
constitutional. 3 
2. Wigmore, Juvenile Court vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375 (1926). 
3. 387 U.S. at 79-80 (footnote omitted). 
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Perhaps one reason for the failure of the juvenile court to 
reach the lofty heights anticipated by its founders, and one which 
might explain Justice Stewart's lament, is that simply too much 
was expected of it, which is so often the pitfall of reform efforts. 
One need only look at the statements of some of the persons 
prominent in the creation and management of the court to appre-
ciate this suggestion. For example, Ryerson quotes one reformer 
who believed: ~'There is such a thing as an instantaneous awaken-
ing of the soul to the realization of higher and better things by 
the magnetic influence of one soul reacting upon another." An-
other commented: "There is no more potent influence over a boy 
than a good man or woman . . . . The way to make a good boy 
is to rub him against a good man." Such boundless faith in the 
rehabilitative ideal! It is no wonder that it was doomed, if not to 
failure, then to disappointing abstraction. 
It is precisely in the area of the reformers' extraordinary ide-
alism and faith in the regenerative potential of the juvenile court 
that Ryerson reveals great insight. As we look back over the enor-
mous changes that have taken place in the present century, the 
reformers seem to take on an almost two-dimensional quality. 
More important, their statements appear so out of focus with 
reality, albeit perhaps only because viewed by us from afar, that 
they seem to have viewed the subjects of their own concern-the 
children-as being two-dimensional themselves. 
Disillusionment over what the juvenile court has become 
unquestionably exists, but Ryerson is not overly pessimistic. She 
predicts, safely, that the juvenile court will continue to exist in 
some form, if for no other reasons than that it seems to do no 
harm to treat children separately from adults and that we do not 
hastily discard old ways of dealing with social problems. She 
ends on an almost positive note: "Due process thinking and more 
modest ambitions may help us stage a not too undignified re-
treat. We need not be too gloomy about the retreat: if experience 
dictates that we aim to do less with law, there is at least the pos-
sible satisfaction of doing it more frankly and fairly." A juvenile 
court with limited rehabilitative goals and with procedural safe-
guards to protect the rights of youthful offenders would seem 
most likely to fulfill the ideal of fairness without the danger of 
inflating expectations. 
